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ABSENTEEISM AND THE ADA: THE LIMITS AND THE
LOOPHOLES
Megan G. Rosenberger'
A survey of absencesfrom June 1997 to May 1998 conducted by
Commerce Clearing House, a publisher of employment law
information,reports that employee absenteeism in 1998 increased
25 percent from the previous year. The statistics suggest that
personal demands and family-related absences, rather than
illness, account for a large portion of workplace absenteeism.
How do employers cope with these figures? One way is by
knowing your legal responsibilitiesand obligations to employees
before leave issues arise.'
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA" or
"the Act") 2 to broaden the scope of protections available to persons with
disabilities.3 Title I of the ADA provides that no employer governed by
the Act may discriminate in the terms and conditions of employment
against a qualified person with a disability.4 A qualified person with a

' Megan G. Rosenberger received her J.D. from The Columbus School of Law at the
Catholic University of America in May 2001. This article won the John Fanning
Interschool Labor Law Writing Competition for 1999-2000. Ms. Rosenberger wishes to
thank Professor Roger Hartley.
1. Christine M. Cieplinski, Ins and Outs of Workplace Absenteeism, 7 CONN. EMPL.
L. LETTER 2 (1999).
2. Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-02, 12111-17 (2000).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9), (b)(1) (2000) (establishing that "the continuing existence
of unfair and unnecessary discrimination and prejudice denies people with disabilities the
opportunity to compete on an equal basis" and that a purpose of the Act is "to provide a
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
The purpose of the ADA was to "eliminat[e]
individuals with disabilities").
discrimination against people with disabilities; fully integrat[e] disabled Americans into
the society in general and economic life in particular; and transfer[] the costs of supporting
individuals with disabilities from the public to the private sector." JONATHAN R. MOOK,
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: EMPLOYEE RIGHTS & EMPLOYER OBLIGATIONS
2-33 (1999) (citing Elizabeth Clark Morin, Note, Americans With DisabilitiesAct of 1990:
Social Integration Through Employment, 40 CATH. U.L. REV. 189 (1990)).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000) (noting that an employer violates the ADA when it
discriminates "against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of
such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or
discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment").
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disability must be able to perform the essential functions of the job with
or without a reasonable accommodation. In providing these protections,
Congress encouraged an interactive process between the employer and

the employee whereby the parties themselves could agree on a
reasonable accommodation.' Occasionally, however, this process of
mutual agreement fails and litigation ensues.

While Congress enacted the ADA to provide protection to persons
with disabilities and, in particular, to provide them job security, courts'
interpretations of the statute effectively halted the protection to a certain

class of persons with disabilities.7 While some employees require
accommodations that can be provided at the workplace, other employees
require accommodations that permit absences from the workplace. In
particular, employees who suffer from chronic or unpredictable

disabilities often need time off or flexible leave as a reasonable
accommodation.8 When this is the requested accommodation, employers
and courts are much less willing to provide the accommodation because
there is undue hardship on the employer.9 In a controversial
development, many courts have determined that "presence is an essential

function" of most jobs.' ° This rule is considered a matter of law rather
than a question of fact and has thus taken the protection of the ADA

away from persons with chronic or unpredictable illnesses or disabilities
by using their frequent or unplanned absences against them, regardless
of the circumstances."

While the EEOC intended that ADA cases be

5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000) (defining "qualified individual with a disability"
as "an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or
desires").
6. See Mook, supra note 3, at 6-17 (stating that a "reasonable accommodation at
base is a 'problem solving approach"') (citing S. REP. No. 116, at 34 (1989) (Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources)).
7. See, e.g., Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctr., Inc., 31 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 1994); Jackson v.
Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277 (11th Cir. 1994).
8. See Audrey E. Smith, Comment, The "Presence Is An Essential Function" Mytv
The ADA's Trapdoorfor the Chronically Ill, 19 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 163, 163-64 (1995)
(stating that "[i]n nearly all cases, long-term chronic illnesses satisfy the ADA's broad
definition of disability").
9. Id. at 170-72.
10. See id. at 163.
But see EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable
Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, n.61, at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/accommodation.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2001) (stating that
while some courts "have characterized attendance as an 'essential function'... [it] is not
an essential function as defined by the ADA because it is not one of 'the fundamental job
duties of the employment position").
11. See Smith, supra note 8, at 163.
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subjected to a fact-intensive, case-by-case analysis, 12 the courts have
chosen not to use this type of analysis when considering the issue of
presence in the workplace.' 3 Although presence may be an essential
function in many jobs, a disabled person should nonetheless have the
opportunity to present evidence to the contrary for his or her individual
circumstances.
This article analyzes the ADA regulations, focusing on the regulations'
effect on attendance requirements. Next, the article provides an
overview of how the courts currently address attendance requirements.
This analysis illustrates the difference in the levels of proof required by
courts for attendance policies. The article then examines the different
accommodations requested by employees that address the inflexible
attendance policies. Finally, the article demonstrates that employers are
given a free "out" when they deal with an employee who has an
imperfect attendance record.
I. SETFING FORTH THE FRAMEWORK

Congress enacted the ADA to employ millions of disabled Americans
who were out of work, to stop the discrimination and exclusion of
disabled persons, and to equalize the treatment for Americans who,
through circumstances out of their control, are forced to live life as
disabled persons." While the ADA broadens the scope of coverage for
disabled individuals, the statutory framework of the ADA sets a high
standard for individuals seeking its protection. Initially, the individual
seeking protection under the ADA must establish that the Act covers
her disability.' 5 The Act defines an individual with a disability as one

12. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (2000) (listing factors that should be considered in
determining whether a job function is essential). The interpretative guidelines issued by
the EEOC state that "[w]hether a particular function is essential is a factual determination
that must be made on a case by case basis." Appendix to 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2000).
13. See, e.g., Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 279 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding
that regular attendance is an essential function of the job); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that "coming to work regularly" is an essential function of the
job).
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2000). But see Ruth Colker, Hypercapitalisr" Affirmative
Protectionsfor People with Disabilities,Illness and ParentingResponsibilities Under United
States Law, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 213, 215 (1997) (presenting the argument that the
ADA conflicts with free market principles that reason that "the state should not require
that the private sector use affirmative programs to improve the employability of members
of the disadvantaged groups because there is no objective way to determine who is
historically disadvantaged and because state intervention into private markets is an

inefficient remedy for any social problem").
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000) (stating that discrimination against a qualified individual
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who (1) has a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of the [individual's] major life activities"; (2) has a record of
such impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment.' 6 If
the plaintiff satisfies one of these requirements, then the individual must
show that she was discriminated against by a "covered entity."' 7 In
addition, the individual must establish that she is a "qualified individual
with a disability,"' 8 which is met when the individual satisfies the
prerequisites of the job and accomplishes the essential functions of the
position with or without a reasonable accommodation.' 9 In order to
examine employee absences, it is important to analyze what may be
deemed a prerequisite, what qualifies as an essential function, and what
individuals with disabilities can expect as a reasonable accommodation.
Job prerequisites are those requirements that the applicant must meet
before she will be considered for the position. The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "the Commission") developed
regulations to implement the ADA.2 °
The regulations define
"qualification standards" to include education, experience, and skill as
permissible job prerequisites, however, this definition does not provide
an exhaustive list. 2' The courts have added items, such as presence at the
workplace, to the list of job prerequisites detailed in the EEOC
regulations.22 Generally, employers freely establish the prerequisites for
a position; however, when these prerequisites are challenged, an
employer must prove that the 2prerequisites
are "job related and
3
consistent with business necessity.,
with a disability is prohibited); see also Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental
Health, 198 F.3d 68, 71 (2d. Cir. 1999) (laying out the elements required to state a claim
for discrimination under the ADA).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination by a "covered entity"); 42
U.S.C. § 1.2111(2) (2000) (defining "covered entity" as an "employer, employment agency,
labor organization, or joint labor-management committee").
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination against a "qualified
individual with a disability"); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the
definition of "qualified individual with a disability").
19. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2000).
20. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2000). The Appendix to this part provides the EEOC's
interpretations as guidance for applying the regulations. See Appendix to 29 C.F.R. pt.

1630 (2000).
21. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q) (2000).
22. See, e.g., Dutton v. Johnson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 859 F. Supp. 498,
508 (D. Kan. 1994) (stating that attendance is an essential part of most jobs); Jackson v.
Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277, 278 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that regular attendance is an
essential element of the job).
23. Mook, supra note 3, at 4-9 n.3. (noting that the EEOC does not require that job
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The next step in examining an employee's absences is to determine
what job functions are essential. The ADA does not define "essential
functions," therefore, the essential functions of each position are
determined on a case-by-case basis. The EEOC regulations define
"essential functions" of a job as "the fundamental job duties of the
employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires."2
The EEOC regulations also articulate considerations for determining
whether a particular function should be deemed essential. 25 The nonexhaustive list of reasons that may lead to a determination that a
function is essential includes: (1) "the reason the position exists is to
perform that function"; (2) there are a limited number of employees
among whom the performance of that function can be distributed; or (3)
the function is so highly specialized that an individual is hired for her
expertise or ability to perform the particular function.26 While the
employer's business judgment factors into this analysis, it is not
dispositive of the issue.27
If an individual is a qualified person with a disability then the employer
may be required to provide that individual with a reasonable
accommodation enabling that individual to perform the essential
functions of the job.2 '
The ADA provides that a reasonable
accommodation may include "job restructuring, part-time [employment]
or modified work schedules., 29 The EEOC regulations expand upon the
potential accommodations listed in the ADA, but the regulations also
emphasize that the list is not exhaustive.30 Discussing other possible
accommodations, the appendix to the regulations suggests "permitting
the use of accrued paid leave or providing additional unpaid leave for

prerequisites be job related or consistent with business necessity unless "an individual
meets all the job prerequisites except those that he or she cannot satisfy because of a
disability, then the employer must show that the prerequisites that screened out the person
are job related and consistent with business necessity").
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (2000).
25. See supra note 12.
26. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii) (2000).
27. See 29 C.F.R § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) (2000) (listing the employer's judgment as one of
seven factors to be considered in determining whether a particular function is essential).
28. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (defining "discrimination" to
include an employer's failure to make a reasonable accommodation for a qualified
individual with a disability).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2000).
30. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2) (2000); see also Appendix to 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630
(2000) (stating that the listing "of the most common types of accommodations that an
employer may be required to provide.. .is not intended to be exhaustive of
accommodation possibilities").

962

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 50:957

necessary treatment."' '
In determining what constitutes a reasonable accommodation, an
employer is not required to provide any accommodation that imposes an
undue hardship on its business.32 The ADA defines an "undue hardship"
as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense" when
considering the factors for determining whether an accommodation
causes an undue hardship.3 3 The EEOC regulations concerning undue
hardship follow closely the statutory language of the ADA.34 The factors
for determining whether an undue hardship exists illustrate Congress'
intent to balance the interests of the disabled person against the interests
of the employer.3" While the imposition of an undue burden is available
as an affirmative defense for the employer, to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination an employee has the burden to prove that an
accommodation is reasonable and not an undue burden on the
employer.36
Courts have held that an employer who offers an accommodation in
the past is not required to continue offering it in the future and that such
an offering does not deem the accommodation reasonable.3 ' The courts,
however, should reconsider this proposition's application.
If an
employer provided an accommodation to an employee in the past, that
employee should not be precluded from using that evidence to prove that
the requested accommodation is reasonable. Thus, the employee could
use the past accommodation to establish her prima facie case of
discrimination. Then the employer would be given the opportunity to
present evidence that the accommodation would constitute an undue
31. Appendix to 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2000).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B) (2000) (listing the factors to be considered in
determining whether an accommodation would cause an undue hardship on an employer).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) (2000).
34. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(p) (2000).
But see Kristen M. Ludgate, Note,
Telecommuting and the Americans with DisabilitiesAct: Is Working at Home a Reasonable
Accommodation?, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1309,1318 (1997) (arguing that the "requirements for
establishing an undue hardship defense are ambiguous, because neither Congress nor the
EEOC have promulgated specific guidelines that distinguish a reasonable accommodation
from an undue hardship").
35. See Smith, supra note 8, at 171.
36. See id.
37. See, e.g., Corder v. Lucent Techs., 162 F.3d 924, 928 (1998) (stating that the
employer "went the extra mile and then some" by agreeing to accommodate the
employee's need for unpredictable time off by placing her in a different office and that
"such an accommodation easily qualifies as a reasonable one for ADA purposes"); see
also Vande Zande v. Wisc. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that
an employer "must not be punished for its generosity by being deemed to have conceded
the reasonableness of [a] far-reaching accommodation").
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burden. If the parties used this approach, then the employee would
receive the benefit of the doubt that an accommodation is reasonable
while the employer would be able to demonstrate why the
accommodation is not reasonable.
II. REGULAR ATTENDANCE REQUIREMENTS

Most employers establish attendance policies that provide vacation,
medical, and sick leave. Employers' policies typically include the
maximum days available for leave as well as procedures for requesting
leave. Attendance policies generally apply the same standards to all
similarly situated employees and maintain equality among employees.
The ADA, a civil rights statute, does more than promote equal
treatment. 38 Rather, the ADA goes further when it mandates that an
employer provide reasonable accommodations to disabled individuals. 9
Thus, while an employer's attendance policy applies equally to all
employees, that policy may actually discriminate against disabled
individuals if it does not consider whether some disabled employees will
need different accommodations.
III. THE COURTS' CURRENT POSITION
Although it may be necessary for many employers to modify their
attendance policies to accommodate disabled employees, the courts have
often extended a "blanket rule" stating that an employee's presence is an
essential function of most jobs.4 ° Some courts rely on this rule to imply
that presence is a minimum requirement of almost all jobs and that any
modification to the attendance requirement is unreasonable because it
would require modification of an essential job function." Under this
analysis, any employee who is not present is not qualified to perform the
job.42 In fact, a change to an employer's attendance policy might impose
38. See Mook, supra note 3, at 6-4.
39. See id. (stating that "the ADA requires an employer to do more than merely
disregard a person's disability; in appropriate circumstances, an employer is obligated to
take affirmative steps to provide 'reasonable accommodation' for the individual with
disabilities").
40. See Smith, supra note 8, at 163.
41. See, e.g., Dutton v. Johnson County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 859 F. Supp. 498,
507-08 (D. Kan. 1994) (citing cases holding that an employee is unqualified if the
attendance requirements of the job are not met); Jackson v. Veterans Admin., 22 F.3d 277,
279 (11th Cir. 1994) (finding that regular attendance is an essential function of the job).
42. See Jackson, 22 F.3d at 279 (stating that the employer had no obligation to
accommodate an employee's absenteeism) (citing Guice-Mills v. Derwinski, 772 F. Supp.
188 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
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an undue hardship on the employer and thus not require the employer to
provide the accommodation.43 Although many employees cannot seek
protection under the ADA, those individuals with chronic illnesses that
require sporadic or extended periods of time off may be covered by the
ADA.44
IV. PROOF ISSUES
In absenteeism cases, the employer rarely defends its assertions
describing the essential functions of a job. To determine which job
functions are essential, an employee filing a discrimination suit under the
ADA must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. 5 Once the
employee establishes his or her case, the burden shifts to the employer,
who may assert undue burden as an affirmative defense.46 In presenting
its defense, an employer must demonstrate which job functions are
essential.47 While the law gives deference to the employer's judgment as
to which functions are essential, the EEOC does not grant the employers
a rebuttable presumption based on their judgment that all functions
identified as essential are essential. 4 The EEOC encourages a factsensitive analysis to determine an essential job function.4 9
If presence is the issue, then employers do not need to defend their
position because courts consider presence an essential job function.5 0 As
a result, an employer that demonstrates presence as the issue will be able
to circumvent the fact-intensive analysis because courts categorize the
issue as a question of law rather than one of fact. l Most courts accept
the proposition that presence is an essential function as a common-sense

43. See Smith, supra note 8, at 178.
44. See id. at 184 (arguing that chronically ill employees are covered by the ADA and
must take sporadic absences as part of their illness).
45. Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for Mental Health, 198 F.3d 68, 71 (2d. Cir.
1999) (stating the elements of a prima facie case).
46. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (2000) (defining the term "undue hardship"); see also
Smith, supra note 8, at 168 (noting that the burden shifts to the employer to prove that
that the accommodation poses an undue hardship).
47. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (2000) (defining "essential functions" as

"the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with
a disability holds or desires").
48. See Appendix to 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2000) (stating that the inquiry regarding
essential functions "is not intended to second guess an employer's business judgment").
49. Appendix to 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2000) (stating that "[w]hether a particular
function is essential is a factual determination that must be made on a case by case basis").
50.

See supra note 12.

51. See Smith, supra note 8, at 163.
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rule.12 This acceptance by the courts forecloses the employee from
casting doubt on the employer's showing that presence is an essential
function.
The reasonable accommodation issue also illustrates the problem with
categorizing employer assertions as matters of law rather than factual
findings. The employee's request for a reasonable accommodation
usually triggers the employer's affirmative responsibility to provide a
reasonable accommodation."
Once the employer is aware of the
employee's situation, the interested parties are encouraged to engage in
a "problem solving approach" to determine what would constitute a
reasonable accommodation.54 This process should include the employer,
employee, and possibly outside technical assistance in an interactive
determination of potential accommodations." This interactive process
reinforces the need for a fact-sensitive analysis. When presence is
automatically deemed an essential function, however, the need for this
case-by-case analysis disappears because any modification to an essential
function would be unreasonable. Without the blanket rule identifying
presence as an essential function, an employee and her employer could
litigate whether presence is a job prerequisite or an essential function,
whether absence is an unreasonable accommodation, and whether the
accommodation is an undue burden.
V. EXCESSIVE ABSENTEEISM

Disability-related absenteeism cases often disregard the need for any
accommodation despite the language in the ADA, which implies that
employers have an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate
individuals with disabilities.56 Employers may rely on the "presence is an
52. See, e.g., Corr v. MTA Long Island Bus, No. 98-9417, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS

25058, at *4 (2d Cir. Oct. 7, 1999) (stating that "an essential aspect of many jobs is the
ability to appear at work regularly and on time") (citation omitted); Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d
525, 529 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that "coming to work regularly" is an essential function

of the job).
53. See Appendix to 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2000) ("Once a qualified individual with a
disability has requested provision of a reasonable accommodation, the employer must

make a reasonable effort to determine the appropriate accommodation.").
54. See MOOK, supra note 3, at 6-17.
55. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630(o)(3) (2000) (stating that "[t]o determine the appropriate
reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an
informal, interactive process with the qualified individual with a disability in need of the
accommodation").
56. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2000) (stating that a "'reasonable accommodation' may
include ...job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules... and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities").
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essential function" theory that grants them the right to be inflexible
when they assert that excessive absences or time off is unreasonable.
One serious flaw in the courts' current analysis enables some disabled
employees to receive accommodations over others. In particular,
employees who require extended, unpaid leave are more likely to be
accommodated than employees who miss work unpredictably. 7
Ironically, it is possible that the unpredictable absences may add up to
much less time off than the scheduled leave and even less than the
employee's allotted time off.
Heyman v. Queens Village Committee for Mental Health," provides an
example of an employer that attempted to avoid accommodating an
employee with unpredictable absences. In Heyman, the Second Circuit
considered the district court's decision to enter summary judgment in
favor of an employer that fired an employee soon after learning that he
was diagnosed with lymphoma. 9 Prior to the employee's firing, a coworker had suffered and died from the same disease."0 The employee
claimed that his termination was pretextual and that the employer fired
him because of its concern that the employee may not be able to meet
the "level of time commitment required" solely based on its experience
with a previous employee.' In an attempt to rely on the "presence is an
essential function" theory, the employer, relying on its past experience,
asserted that the employee could not perform the essential functions of
his management position if he did not adhere to the standard attendance
policy.62 The Second Circuit vacated the district court's judgment
entering summary judgment for the employer and remanded the case.63
Conversely, in Waggoner v. Olin Corp.,64 the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of the employer's motion for summary judgment
and dismissal of the employee's action under the ADA.6 5 The employee

57. See Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d. 1243, 1247 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating
that extended unpaid leave is potentially a reasonable accommodation); but see Waggoner
v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481, 484 (7th Cir. 1.999) (stating that persons with "erratic,
unexplained absences, even when those absences are a result of a disability" are not
protected by the ADA).
58. 198 F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 1999),
59. Id. at 70-71.
60. Id. at 70.
61. Id. at 71.
62. Id. at 73 (discussing that a jury could find that based on its experience the
employer could have believed that the employee's attendance would falter).
63. Id. at 74.
64. 169 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999).
65. Id. at 485.
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in Waggoner suffered from "visual disturbances" which qualified as a
disability.6 6 During the twenty-month period of her employment,
Waggoner missed or was late for work on forty separate occasions and
took a five-month medical leave because of her disability.67 In upholding
the motion for summary judgment, the court explained that the ADA
does not require employers to accommodate erratic, unexplained
This
absences because attendance is a requirement of most jobs."
explanation exemplifies the error in the courts' current analysis of
absenteeism under the ADA because it demonstrates how courts assume
that presence at the job site is required and therefore, any request to
forgo attendance is per se unreasonable. In Waggoner, the Seventh
Circuit accepted as a matter of law that attendance is a prerequisite or an
essential function of employment. 9 Consequently, the court took an
issue of fact, which should be decided by the trier of fact, and announced
a rule of law.7" Specifically, this rule allows employers to circumvent the
case-by-case analysis encouraged by the statute.
As a result of the rule created by courts, employees seeking an
accommodation permitting erratic or unpredictable absences are likely to
face a tougher burden than those that request a specific amount of
absences.7 Some courts have determined that a request for an indefinite
amount of leave disqualifies the employee from the protection of the
ADA,72 which illustrates the bias incorporated into the ADA that certain
disabilities should be treated differently.

66. Id. at 482.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 484 (stating that it is "fair to conclude that in most instances the ADA
does not protect persons who have erratic, unexplained absences, even when those
in most cases, attendance at the job site is a basic
absences are a result of a disability ....
requirement of most jobs").
69. Id.
70. But see id. at 485 (stating that the court is "not establishing a hard-and-fast rule
that no absences from work need be tolerated" but that "as a matter of law" the
employee's request for indefinite leave was not reasonable).
71. See id. (referring to Waggoner's request for time off, the court found that "[s]he
simply wanted to miss work whenever she felt she needed to and apparently for so long as
she felt she needed to"). The court also indicated that the employee would have been in a
better position if she requested a lump amount of time off rather than the erratic,
unpredictable days that she was occasionally requesting. Id. The court stated that the
employee would have had a better argument if she "request[ed] a leave so that she would
have time to refine the dosage of her medication so that she could return to work on a
regular basis." Id.
72. See, e.g., Walton v. Mental Health Assoc., 168 F.3d 661, 671 (3d Cir. 1999)
(holding that employee's request for continued leave would have created an undue burden
on the employer).
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VI. MODIFIED WORK SCHEDULES/PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT

Many people with disabilities may require modified work schedules
that allow them the flexibility to leave work during the day or to
schedule medical appointments that may interfere with the standard
work schedule. In adopting the ADA, Congress stressed that modified
work schedules or part-time employment may be reasonable
accommodations to disabled individuals.7" The courts and the EEOC
have reinforced this position."4 The EEOC guidelines state that an
employer must provide a modified or part-time work schedule when it is
a reasonable accommodation, and does not cause an undue burden on
the employer.7" While such an accommodation is not automatically
reasonable, the EEOC indicates its desire to have employers "carefully
assess" such a possibility before discharging an employee."
VII. UNPAID LEAVE

The ADA does not require employers to compensate disabled
individuals who are incapable of performing the work.77 While Congress
intended to shift some of the burden of supporting disabled individuals
from the public to the private sector, it did not intend to cripple the
private sector.7" Thus, unpaid leave is more accepted than paid leave as a
reasonable accommodation.
A recent Ninth Circuit decision instructs courts on how they should
proceed when the employee requests unpaid leave as the reasonable
accommodation. 79 In Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the employee
suffered from a fainting disorder that occasionally caused periods of
unconsciousness.8 The employer's attendance policy granted employees
short-term medical leave absences for up to one year.8 ' The employer

73. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, at 62 (1990) (referring to a "reasonable accommodation"
as providing a person with epilepsy with a constant rather than a varying shift).
74. See, e.g., Ralph v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 135 F.3d. 166, 172 (1st Cir. 1.998) (stating
that a modified work schedule is a potential reasonable accommodation); see also
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 10, at 2.
75. Enforcement Guidance, supra note 10, at 2.
76. See id.
77. See Anderson v. United Airlines, No. 95-1.458 Section "L", 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3555 (E.D. La. Mar. 18,1996).
78. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of the Act and
omitting any desire to bankrupt the private sector).
79. See Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d. 1243 (9th Cir. 1999).
80. Id. at 1245.
81. Id.

Absenteeism and the ADA

2001l

969

82
terminated the employee's job after she took seven months of leave.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to grant summary
judgment and remanded the case because the court found that there was
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the employee's medical
leave was a reasonable accommodation. 3 In finding for the employee,
the Ninth Circuit stated that extended leave could be reasonable if it did
not unduly burden the employer. 4 If such leave is reasonable, the
absence during that period does not render an employee unqualified."
In Nunes, the court evaluated the specific facts of the case and did not
86
just assume that the employee was unqualified because of her absences.
The Nunes decision alerted employers that extended medical leave may
be viewed as a reasonable accommodation protected by the ADA even
when an8 employee
"is completely unable to work for an extended period
7

of time.

1

Giardinav. HealthNow New York, Inc.88 illustrates why courts need to
conduct a case-by-case analysis for situations involving unpaid leave. In
Giardina, the court granted the employer's motion for summary
judgment where an employee alleged that she was a wrongfully
terminated qualified person with a disability under the ADA. 9 The
employee began working for the employer in 1988 and took disability
leave beginning in March 1993.90 On May 8, 1999, the employer
terminated the employee after a six-year leave of absence. 9' The court
ruled in favor of the employer, effectively holding that such a substantial
leave of absence was not a reasonable accommodation and that because
the employee was "incapable of any work at that time" the termination
did not violate the ADA.92 Although the court found for the employer,
it did so based on a specific analysis of the facts and did not rely on the
82. Id. at 1245-46.

83. Id. at 1249.
84. See id. at 1247.
85. Id. at 1247 (citation omitted) (stating that "[e]ven an extended medical leave, or

an extension of an existing leave period, may be a reasonable accommodation if it does
not pose an undue hardship on the employer. If [the employee's] medical leave was a

reasonable accommodation, then her inability to work during the leave period would not
automatically render her unqualified").
86. See id.
87.

Perkins Coie, Extended Medical Leave Can Be A "Reasonable Accommodation,"

4 ALA. EMPL. L. LETrER 6 (1999).

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

No. 97-CV-0078E(M), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 840 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 25,2000).
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rule that presence is an essential function as a matter of law.
VIII. TELECOMMUTING AS AN ALTERNATIVE
Some courts have "declined to deem attendance an essential element
of the job in situations where the employee was capable of performing all
necessary functions of his/her work away from the worksite."93 In
Langon v. Department of Health & Human Services,94 the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for the employer.95 The court found that there was a
genuine issue of material fact relating to the disagreement between the
employee and employer over whether the employee could work from
home.96 The employee was a computer programmer with a satisfactory
record of employment when she began suffering increased symptoms of
multiple sclerosis.97 The disability forced the employee to make
numerous changes in her work habits, including working late to
compensate for time missed in the morning, taking leave without pay,
and eventually working on a part-time schedule. 98 The employer worked
with the employee to accommodate her needs;99 however, when the
employee requested to work from home as a reasonable accommodation,
the employer refused to accommodate the request. 9° The employer
used the fact that other computer programmers in the same position had
to do their work in the workplace to justify the denial of her request.'0 '
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the district
02
court's decision to grant summary judgment on behalf of the employer. 1
In Langon, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia found
that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the feasibility of

93. Robert B. Gordon & Christopher L. Ekman, Attendance Control Issues Under the
ADA and FMLA, 13 LAB. L. 393,396 (1997).
94. 959 F.2d 1.053 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
95. Id. at 1061 ("In sum, because there are genuine factual disputes... summary
judgment should not have been granted.").
96. Id. at 1060.
97. See id. at 1054 (describing the employee's work as satisfactory for the first twentyone months of her employment).
98. See id. at 1054-55 (listing the employer's changes to employee's work
environment).
99. Id. at 1054-55.
100. Id. (stating that the employer rejected employee's request because the job of
"computer programmer 'does not lend itself to work at home"').
101. Id. at 1060.
102. Id. at 1058.

20011

Absenteeism and the ADA

allowing the employee to work from home.' °3 The employer supported
its position by presenting a memorandum that it issued citing the
infeasibility of this particular employee's accommodation.' 4
The
employee, however, provided her job description and convinced the
court that her position "did not demand her being in the office,"' 0 5 and
therefore the accommodation would be both feasible and reasonable. By
viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court of
appeals found that summary judgement was inappropriate and therefore
reversed and remanded the case so that a trier of fact could consider the
question of whether the employee's request was feasible. 06
While the Langon court recognized the potential of working from
home, there are conflicting views regarding this alternative.'0 7 In Vande
° the court held that
Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration,108
it would follow the "majority rule," holding that an employer need not
accommodate a disable employee by allowing him to work from home.' 9
The court also stated that it would take an extraordinary case to permit
the employee to litigate the issue in court."' While the court recognized
that communications technology may advance to the point where
working from home is a reasonable accommodation, the court did not
require the employer to illustrate an undue burden caused by the
accommodation because the court rejected working from home as a
reasonable accommodation at the present time."'
The court's
determination rested on a narrow interpretation of the ADA and did not

103. Id. at 1060.
104. See id. (stating that the employer pointed to its letter to the employee as evidence
that the feasibility of working from home was an undisputed fact).
105. Id.
106. Id (stating that "[a]t all events, [employee], through her deposition testimony,
has disagreed with HHS about the length of the deadlines and the need for frequent faceto-face contacts. A genuine dispute about this material fact thus exists").
107. See Ludgate, supra note 34, at 1324 (recognizing that there are conflicting views
relating to telecommuting. Some proponents argue that the arrangement "facilitate[s]
improved employment opportunities for disabled individuals." However, other critics fear
that telecommuting arrangements may segregate disabled individuals from the
mainstream workforce.).
108. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
109. Id. at 544 ("[A]n employer is not required to accommodate a disability by
allowing the disabled worker to work, by himself, without supervision, at home.").
110. Id. at 545 ("[Ijt would take a very extraordinary case for the employee to be able
to create a triable issue of the employer's failure to allow the employee to work at
home.").
111. Id. at 544 ("This will no doubt change as communications technology advances,
but [that] is not the situation today.").
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12
require the employer to allow the employee to work from home.
However, the ADA does not require any specific accommodation, rather
it requires an employer to provide a "reasonable accommodation.""' In
Vande Zande, the employee's inability to demonstrate that working from
home was reasonable prevented her from establishing a prima facie case.
While the above cases involve a rejection of an employee's request for
an accommodation allowing her to complete clerical or administrative
duties from home, other cases reject the requested accommodation for
other job-related reasons. In Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 an
employee was a reservation sales agent and she requested the
accommodation of working from home. 1 15 The employer rejected her
request and cited security concerns and limited computer terminals as
reasons why working from home was unreasonable." 6 While these are
important, specific factors that should be considered in the analysis, the
court dismissed the employee's request to work from home as
"unreasonable as a matter of law.""' 7
Unfortunately, the court
announced its holding as a matter of law and did not analyze the specific
factors that the employer emphasized.

IX. UNSCHEDULED ABSENCES

Courts and employers are unlikely to consider unscheduled absences18
reasonable accommodations. In Jackson v. Veteran's Administration,"
the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's grant of summary
judgment for an employer that fired a disabled housekeeping aide due to
his excessive absences.' The court reasoned that because the employee
was absent on a "sporadic, unpredictable basis, he could not fulfill [an]
essential function of his employment, that of being present on the job."' 20
The court based its decision on the sporadic nature 2of the employee's
absences and not on the excessiveness of his absences. ' '
112. Id. at 545 (stating that the employer "was not required by the Americans with
Disabilities Act to allow [the employee] to work at home").
113. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2000) (stating that an employer discriminates against
an employee if it fails to make a reasonable accommodation).
114. 926 F. Supp. 1555 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
115. See id. at 1557-58.
116. Id. at 1564.
117. Id at 1566.
118. 22 F.3d 277 (llth Cir. 1994).
119. Id. at 278.
120. Id. at 279.
121. Id. at 279 ("But the issue here is not whether absences in excess of allotted leave
are subject to accommodation.. [r]ather .... whether the number of sporadic,

20011

Absenteeism and the ADA

973

The EEOC regulations provide that a reasonable accommodation
"may involve changing when or how an essential function is
performed.' ' 22 The dissent in Jackson stated that the court erred in
finding as a matter of law that the employer did not need to
accommodate the sporadic absences because it should have based its
decision on the specific facts presented to the court.' 23 The fact that the
employee had unused accrued leave raised the question of whether the
court actually looked at the individualized facts of this case.2 4 The
dissent also noted that although there was no showing of excessive
absenteeism in Jackson, the court avoided the question of reasonableness
because it accepted that unpredictable absences are an unreasonable
accommodation without further analysis.121
Like the court's failure to consider the employee's unused leave, the
fact that the employee suggested numerous other accommodations is
another factor that places doubt on the extent of the court's inquiry. 26
In order to accommodate his arthritis, the employee suggested that the
hospital grant him leave for his bi-weekly treatments and when his
arthritis flared up, he could switch hours with other employees, delay his
start time, or just delay less time-sensitive duties. 27 The court thought
that the employee's 8 request was unreasonable because of its
unpredictable nature.
The court's analysis in Jackson creates a bias in favor of some
disabilities over others. For instance, by allowing extended, unpaid
leave, the court's analysis of the ADA favors individuals with disabilities
that require this type of leave, while individuals with chronic or
unpredictable disabilities cannot expect the same protection. The Sixth

unscheduled absences.. .can be reasonably accommodated."). The employer conceded
that the employee only took time off that was allotted to him. Id.
122. Appendix to 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630 (2000) (discussing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)).
123. Jackson, 22 F.3d at 281-82 (Birch, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "[wihether there
was an accommodation the [employer] could have made which would both be reasonable
and allow [employee] to perform his job.... The error in the district court's reasoning is
that it determined as a matter of law that the hospital was not required to accommodate
irregular and unpredictable absences.").
124. Id. (Birch, C.J., dissenting) ("[The employee] had not used any leave other than
his accrued time off... [and his] absenteeism may have been.., irregular and
unpredictable, but.., it was not excessive.").
125. See id at 282 (Birch, C.J., dissenting). The court's treatment of this issue may
create a per se rule that irregular or unpredictable absences are unreasonable.
126. Id. at 279 (finding that "[s]uch accommodations do not address the heart of the
problem: the unpredictable nature of [the employee's] absences").
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Circuit attempted to explain this disparity in Parker v. Metropolitan Life
Insurance Co., 9 when it explained that the ADA prohibits
discrimination between disabled and nondisabled, but does not mandate
equality between individuals with different disabilities.' 30 While this
proposition may be the answer, it seems that Congress already attempted
to exclude those disabilities that do not deserve protection by statutorily
defining and then excluding in the ADA.''
Regardless of this potential bias against certain disabilities that have
chronic and unpredictable effects, the courts are consistently against
providing ADA protection to such claims. In Cino v. Sikorsky Aircraft &
United Technologies Corp.,'32 the court found that the employee's
termination was not motivated by discrimination. 13 3 Instead, the court
held that the employee's poor attendance record rendered him
unqualified to perform
his job.' 4 Thus, he was not afforded protection
13 5
ADA.
under the
In Dutton v. Johnson County Board of County Commissioners,136
however, the court denied the employer's motion for summary judgment
based on sporadic absences because it found that there was a genuine
issue of material fact as to the reasonableness of the proposed
accommodation. '37 The employee suffered from migraine headaches
that caused him to miss work sporadically.' 38 Since the employee's
absences were not excessive and the employer was not able to establish
that his performance suffered, the court ruled in favor of the
employee. 139 Thus, the court suggested that predictable attendance
was
40
not essential as long as the employee's performance did not suffer.

129. 121 F.3d 1006 (6th Cir. 1997).
130. Id. at 101.5 ("The ADA does not mandate equality between individuals with
different disabilities.").
131. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(d) (2000) (stating that employers may refuse to
accommodate individuals with infections and communicable diseases).
132. 42 F. Supp. 2d 147 (D. Conn. 1998).
133. See id. at 151.
134. Id. (citing the employee's poor attendance record as proof that he could not
"fulfill [the] minimum expectations" of the job).
135. Id.
136. 859 F. Supp. 498 (D. Kan. 1994).
137. Id. at 509.
138. See id. at 501.
139. Id. at 507 ("The court determines that defendant has not established that
plaintiff's proposed accommodation is unreasonable or that it would impose an undue
hardship.").
140. Gordon & Ekman, supra note 92, at 396 (stating that the court's conclusion in
Dutton suggested that "predictable attendance was not an essential function of [the
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X. CONCLUSION

Although the ADA protects disabled employees, no employee covered
by the ADA will be granted any more leave than a nondisabled
employee. As a result, excessive, chronic absenteeism will not be
accommodated.
Courts, however, have almost always dismissed
categorically claims where the employee's absences were unpredictable
but not excessive. The case law indicates that employees' absences,
excessive or not, will not be tolerated by employers or courts. While
some absences obviously can be deemed excessive, the courts should
follow a case-by-case analysis that looks at all of the particular facts
involved and refrain from relying on the "presence is essential" rule.
Without such an approach, the goals of the ADA will continue to be
frustrated and there will also be an unnecessary loss of jobs in this
country.

employee's] job").
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